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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The matter has been

poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are none.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit for a personal injury allegedly
resulting from a courtesy clerk's bumping into the back of her
ankle with an empty grocery cart.

At the conclusion of a jury

trial, the jury rendered a verdict of no cause of action and
judgment was entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

voir

1.

Plaintiff did not preserve her request for additional

dire

questions on the record in a timely fashion.

reference at all in the record to voir

dire

The only

requests or objec-

tions came after the jury had been selected, those not selected
had been excused and the first witness had testified.
point, the following exchange took place:

At that

THE COURT: Let's go on the record now and show
that in this Myers vs. Albertsons case, we are in an in
chambers conference. And Mr. Hasenyager wanted to make
a report of an objection to some evidence that he
thinks potentially would come in in the case.
MR. HASENYAGER: Actually I had two things.
Earlier when we were talking briefly about voir dire
questions, I had proposed a little bit more extensive
questioning under Evans vs. Doty. That was objected to
by Joy because she thought you first needed to establish whether they had heard or read articles recently
that may have had some impact. And that' s not my
reading of Evans vs. Doty.
MS. CLEGG: Could I clarify that so that's on the
record? My objection was not that you had to show they
had actually seen these publications, but that there
was a likelihood they had been exposed, even if it was
just in a doctor's office or something. And then you
could ask them whether they had actually read it.
Mr. Hasenyager: And the questions that I proposed
to ask them were generally some general tort reform
questions. In substance whether they felt that injury
cases affected insurance rates. Whether they felt
there ought to be a cap on damages on injury cases for
certain types of injuries. And those kind of things.
And we discussed it briefly. And your Honor felt that
that was a little bit broader than what we should be
asking them. But it is a subject that I feel we are
entitled to go into.

THE COURT: We will go back on the record again.
Let me come back to the first comment you made,
Mr. Hasenyager. The record should show that we did
have that discussion without the benefit of a record
being made concerning what questions might be asked on
voir dire. That it was suggested by defense counsel
-2-

that a more general question be asked of the panel
members concerning whether they would have any bias
against someone who might bring this type of action for
injuries sustained in a personal injury. And there was
no response from any of the jurors that they had any
bias in that area. And Mr. Hasenyager is correct, it
was my ruling and my position that we should stay more
general in nature in the questioning in this particular
case. This is not a medical malpractice case, and it
is the Court's position that the question that was
asked adequately covered the area that needed to be
delved into. But the Court does note your objection,
Mr. Hasenyager.
(Tr. 59-61; R. 197-99.)
voir

dire

Plaintiff made no record at all of any

request or objection before voir

was passed for cause and testimony began.

dire

ended, the jury

Even then, plaintiff

did not make a record of what specific questions were desired.
2.

On October 18, 1990, Kim Jensen, a courtesy clerk for

Albertsons on 40th and Washington in Ogden, Utah was returning
several empty grocery carts to the store.

He was stopped just

outside the south entrance door waiting for customers to precede
him into the store.

Plaintiff was the last customer ahead of him

entering the store.

When he thought that plaintiff had advanced

far enough ahead of him, he started slowly pushing the carts into
the store.

The next thing he knew, the plaintiff got angry at

him and accused him of bumping into her with the lead cart he was

-3-

pushing.

He did not realize he had bumped her until she got

angry at him.
3.

(Tr. 230-33, R. 368-71.)

The courtesy clerk, Kim Jensen, was mentally impaired

due to brain tumor which retarded his development cis a child.
(Tr. 239-40, R. 377-78.)
4.

Plaintiff waited three weeks before seeking treatment.

(T. 153, R. 291.)
5.

Plaintiff's husband testified that her knee symptoms

did not begin until six to eight months after the incident.
(Tr. 146, R. 284.)
6.

The only injury that the plaintiff complained of to the

store director, Craig Howard, was a bump to the back of her heel
which left a red mark.

(Tr. 242-43, R. 622-23.)

The plaintiff

declined Mr. Howard's offer of assistance and left the store.
(Tr. 254, R. 392.)

This lawsuit was Mr. Howard's first notice

that the plaintiff was complaining of something other than a bump
to her heel.
7.

(Tr. 256, R. 394.)

Mr. Howard testified that if indeed the plaintiff was

facing the entrance door and was walking between the railings
into the store, there would be insufficient room between the

-4-

railings for a cart to come from behind the plaintiff and cross
over the top of the plaintiff's foot.

Instead, the cart would

have hit the plaintiff on the back of the heel.

(Tr. 257-58, R.

395-96.)
8.
plaintiff.

Dr. JoAnna Erzinger was the neurologist who treated the
(Tr. 108, R. 246.)

Dr. Erzinger diagnosed a

peripheral neuropathy in both of plaintiff's feet which the
doctor opined could not have been caused by a contusion to the
dorsum (top) of the right foot.

The doctor further opined that

3 0-50% of peripheral neuropathy cases have no known cause.
110-112, R. 248-50.)

(Tr.

While Dr. Erzinger stated that the

plaintiff could have causalgia as a result of a contusion to the
dorsum of the right foot, the doctor did not believe that was an
accurate diagnosis since there was no trauma to the left foot and
the plaintiff complained of the same symptoms in both feet with
no differentiation between the two feet.
9.

(Tr. 114-19, R. 252.)

Rickie Sheffield is the chief of Systems Management in

the contracting directorate at Hill Air Force Base.

He was

plaintiff's direct supervisor from July or August of 1992 through
August of 1994.

(Tr. 199, R. 337.)

-5-

Although Mr. Sheffield had

supervised the plaintiff for two years after the incident, he
knew absolutely nothing about the incident or her alleged injury
until November of 1993 when the plaintiff called him to let him
know he was going to be deposed in this lawsuit.

When he told

the plaintiff he knew nothing about the incident or her alleged
injury, she said she would give him a document the next week to
refresh his recollection.
Record.

That document is Exhibit No. 5 in the

(Tr. 201-2, R. 339-40.)

Although the plaintiff gave him

the document to refresh his recollection, he denies that the
signature on the document was his and denies it is a form he has
ever seen or a form that is used by Hill Air Force Base.

He

testified that his signature on the document which purports to
outline plaintiff's employment and injury received in the
incident is a forgery.

(Tr. 202-23, R. 340-361.)

The plaintiff

claimed that the document had been typed on Mr. Sheffield's
secretary's machine, however, Mr. Sheffield checked the type on
that machine with the type on the form and found them to be
different.

(Tr. 207, R. 345.)

He further testified that Connie

Myers has a reputation for dishonesty:
Q:

Do you have an opinion as to Connie's reputation
for truthfulness?
-6-

A:

In my opinion Connie Myers is not very honest.
believe her to be a predator. . . .

I

(Tr. 209-10, R. 347.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the obligation to provide an
adequate record on appeal for reviewing the voir

dire

issue and

this Court should not consider that claim.
voir

The trial court did not abuse its discretion during
dire

because this was not a type of case, such as a medical

malpractice case where there has been publicity concerning
verdict amounts, the plaintiff did not submit proposed voir

dire

questions on the record nor any example of tort reform propaganda
which plaintiff now alleges could have biased the jury.

The

plaintiff simply did not create a situation, such as was her
burden to do, in which it would have been appropriate for the
trial court to ask additional voir

dire

questions.

The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion
for a directed verdict.

There was ample evidence to support the

jury's verdict in favor of the defendant.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ADEQUATELY PRESERVE THE
VOIR DIRE ARGUMENT FOR REVIEW.
The burden is always on the party objecting to make certain
that the record adequately preserves an objection or argument for
review in the event of an appeal.

Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) . An off-the-record discussion
during which plaintiff requested additional voir
insufficient to preserve the issue for review.

dire

is

Plaintiff's

failure to make a timely record of what questions she wanted and
why she wanted them bars this Court's ability to even consider
the issue on appeal.
926 (Utah 1993).
preserve voir

dire

Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d

Plaintiff had ample opportunity to timely
objections on the record at the trial court.

Plaintiff's failure to avail herself of that opportunity relieves
this Court of any obligation to hear those objections on appeal.
Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 817 P.2d 341
(Utah App. 1991).
Here, the record is silent regarding voir
objections until voir

dire

dire

requests or

was over, the jury selecbed and passed
-8-

for cause, nonselected jurors were excused and plaintiff had
begun the presentation of evidence.

It was not until after the

plaintiff's first witness had testified that plaintiff's
dire

request was even mentioned on the record.

voir

Even then, the

record only reveals a brief, general, paraphrasing by plaintiff's
counsel of an earlier off-the-record discussion.

This was far

too little, far too late:
MR. HASENYAGER: And the questions that I proposed to
ask them were generally some general tort reform
questions. In substance whether they felt that injury
cases affected insurance rates. Whether they felt
there ought to be a cap on damages on injury cases for
certain types of injury. And those kinds of things.
And we discussed it briefly.
(Tr. 59-60, R. 197.)

Even had the foregoing voir

dire

request

been made on the record in a timely fashion before the jury was
empaneled and the testimony began, it would be an insufficient
record to determine whether or not the judge erred.

Where there

are no means of verifying what the proposed questions were, the
appellate court usually will not consider a claim based on that
alleged error.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) for

the simple reason that the trial court was not given a fair
opportunity to avoid an error.

Plaintiff should have submitted

-9-

specific questions on the record to preserve the issue for
appeal.

Having failed to fulfill the obligation to succinctly

advise the Court what she wanted and failing to provide an
adequate record on appeal for reviewing the trial judge's ruling,
appellant's first appeal issue must fail.

First Federal Savings

& Loan v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1994).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
The court did not abuse its discretion by not asking tort
reform questions.

To say otherwise would mean that every per-

sonal injury case, not just high publicity, heavily lobbied
matters such as medical malpractice cases, requires tort reform
questioning during voir

dire

even when the plaintiff does not

submit proposed questions on the record and even though the socalled "tort reform media blitz" of the 1980s is ancient history.
It is unreasonable to suggest that juries today are biased
because of a short-lived media blitz during the 1980s in which
the insurance industry and the American Medical Association
publicized tort reform issues, particularly when this is not a

-10-

medical malpractice case nor the type of injury case likely to
result in a significant damage award.
The two cases relied upon by plaintiff are factually distinguishable from the case at hand.

In both Evans v. Doty, 824

P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) and Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96
(Utah App. 1993), the following scenario was present:
1.

They were both medical malpractice cases which was

one of the big focus areas in tort reform publicity during the
1980s because those cases often involve higher jury awards;
2.

In both cases, plaintiffs had submitted written

motions with specific voir

dire

questions in writing and on the

record in a timely fashion before voir
3.

dire

began;

In both cases, plaintiffs submitted specific

examples of the tort reform "propaganda" in question:

in Evans

v. Doty, it was a March 24, 1986 issue of Time entitled "Sorry,
your policy is canceled."

Id. at 462.

In Barrett v. Peterson,

plaintiffs submitted widely distributed advertisements and
articles setting forth insurance industry viewpoints on tort
reform issues.

One of those articles was the same as that used

in the Evans case "Sorry, America, your insurance has been

-11-

canceled," from Time.

Other material included articles published

by the Utah Medical Association which were aimed at the lay
public and had been sent to doctors' offices for distribution in
waiting areas.

Id. at 97.

This scenario was not present here.
malpractice case.
dire

This is not a medical

The plaintiff did not submit proposed

questions on the record or a motion for voir

dire

voir

and

memorandum in support; the plaintiff did not submit any
publication of any sort or even suggest that there had been
recent publication of any tort reform advertisements or articles
which the jury might have read or been exposed to, nor does
plaintiff's brief suggest that any such publication has occurred
since the mid-1980s.
Furthermore, the holdings in Evans and Barrett were not as
broad as plaintiff intimates.

In Evans this Court affirmed the

jury verdict of no cause of action holding that while it was
error not to allow the proposed voir

dire

questions, it did not

rise to the level of an abuse of discretion given the totality of
the questioning during voir

dire.

Similarly, in Barrett, the

court's holding was a narrow one limited to its facts:

-12-

We hold only that in cases such as this one [medical
malpractice case with an excellent record of specific
questions requested, motion and memorandum in support
and specific articles of the alleged propaganda
submitted to the court, much closer in time to the
publication of the allegedly bias-forming materials]
the plaintiff is entitled during voir dire to elicit
information from prospective jurors as to whether they
have read or heard information generally on medical
negligence or tort reform, and to follow up with
appropriate questions if affirmative responses are
received.
Id. at 104.
No matter how plaintiff tries to align this case with
Barrett and Evans, the fact remains that plaintiff simply did not
create a situation, such as was her burden to do, in which it
would have been appropriate for the trial court to ask additional
voir

dire

questions.

Judge Glasmann did not abuse his discretion

in this case under the circumstances.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
Plaintiff correctly states that a motion for a directed
verdict is only appropriate where reasonable minds would not
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented.
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v.
-13-

Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

Plaintiff is

also correct that all evidence on a motion for directed verdict
should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.

Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913

(Utah 1979) .
Having correctly stated the standard, however, the plaintiff's argument on this point references only those facts most
favorable to the plaintiff.

In order to correct this oversight,

defendant recites the following facts which constitute the
evidence viewed in the light most favoring the nonmoving party,
the defendant, as the standard requires:
1.

Even though the plaintiff claimed that she was

impaired at work and even had difficulty driving because of the
injury to her right foot, her boss said that she had never had
any trouble at work, had never requested that she receive help
due to a physical impairment, and that he had not known she was
even injured until she called him to advise his deposition was
scheduled in November 1993. Mr. Sheffield testified that Exhibit
5, a document given to him by the plaintiff in order to try to
refresh his recollection of her injury and employment impairment,

-14-

is a forgery.

Finally, Mr. Sheffield testified that the

plaintiff is a dishonest person and a "predator."
2.

The grocery clerk who was pushing the empty

grocery carts and allegedly struck the plaintiff was mentally
impaired due to a brain tumor which had retarded his development
as a child;
3.

The grocery clerk simply "misjudged"1 the distance

between the bottom leading edge of the first cart in the string
of carts he was pushing and the plaintiff's ankle;
4.

The only injury the plaintiff complained of to the

store director, Craig Howard, was a bump to the back of her
ankle;
5.

Plaintiff waited three weeks to seek treatment

and, even then, sought treatment for injury to a different
portion of her foot, the top, than she had told the manager was
injured in the incident;
6.

Although the plaintiff also claimed knee injuries,

she did not complain of that at the time of her conversation with

*Even the plaintiff's brief admits that the clerk merely
"misjudged" the distance between the lead cart and the plaintiff.
(Plaintiff's Brief, at 8 & 9.)
-15-

the store director nor at the time she first sought treatment
three weeks after the incident.

In fact, her husband testified

that she did not complain about her knee until six to eight
months following the incident;
7.

The plaintiff's only treating neurologist,

Dr. Joanna Erzinger, testified that the symptoms for which she
treated the plaintiff would not have been caused by a trauma to
the right foot since the symptoms in both feet were identical and
that for 30-50% of the patients with this diagnosis (peripheral
neuropathy), there is no known cause for the diagnosis.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could easily have
concluded that the mentally impaired grocery clerk was not
negligent simply because he misjudged the distance between the
front of the lead cart and the plaintiff's ankle.

The jury could

also have believed what the court suggested in denying the motion
for directed verdict:
There was the possibility that the jury in this case
would view the evidence in the way Ms. Clegg has just
described, that there was a bump to the back of the
ankle and no injury. And from that, has concluded that
there was no negligence to be assigned to the defendant

-16-

in this case.
that basis.

And so I am going to deny the motion on

(Tr. 312-313, R. 450-51.)
The plaintiff's argument is flawed by the assumption that
because an accident occurred and because there was some physical
injury, negligence must be presumed.

That simply is not the law.

In fact, MUJI 3.3 entitled FAULT/NEGLIGENCE NOT IMPLIED FROM
INJURY ALONE states "The mere fact that an accident or injury
occurred does not support a conclusion that the defendant or any
other party was at fault or was negligent."
A plaintiff must do more than simply show an accident
resulted in injury.

To prevail on a negligence claim, the

plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed plaintiff a
duty, defendant breached that duty, the breach of duty was a
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and plaintiff in fact
suffered injuries or damages.

Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893

(Utah 1993).
In this case, the jury had ample evidence to find that one
or more of the last three elements of the negligence claim were
absent.

The jury could have found that the mentally impaired

clerk did not breach a duty simply because he misjudged the
-17-

distance between the lead cart and the plaintiff; the jury also
could have found that the incident was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury since her own husband testified that the
plaintiff did not complain about her knee for six to eight
months, she certainly didn't complain about it on the day of the
accident, and her own neurologist testified that the symptoms
plaintiff was complaining of in both feet could not have been
caused by a trauma to one of the feet; the jury also could have
believed that the plaintiff did not, in fact, suffer any injuries
or damages since the cart only bumped her in the back of the
ankle.

Life's road is full of bumps.

Based on the foregoing law and the facts of this case, the
jury simply concluded that even reasonable people misjudge distances and bump into one another and that it is not necessarily
negligence to do so.

Because there was ample evidence to support

the jury verdict, the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict.

-18-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant/appellee
respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be
affirmed.
DATED this^A^ day of October, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ABtotneys fo^ftppellee

n \l563l\3l\brief.app
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